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Abstract 
Family firm is a field of growing interest. The aim of this article is to understand 
whether CEOs identity impacts family firm’s stock returns. From a sample of 
Portuguese and Spanish family firms findings show that who manages the firms result 
in significantly different risk exposure. Moreover, we find that the abnormal return 
found by Fahlenbrach (2009) to founder-controlled firms disappear when we use value-
weighted portfolios and include two new factors: market aggregate illiquidity and debt 
intensity to the four-factor Carhart model. Finally, our results explain why the majority 
of family firm is controlled by its founder. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Family firms are present all over the world. Recent research shows that family firms 
have not only a significant contribution to the world economy and wealth creation, but 
also perform at least as non-family firms (Chami, 2001). 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Barontini and Caprio (2006), and Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) found that family firms have higher operating performance than their 
counterparts. However, evidence about the influence of ownership structure on stock 
returns is still scarce. 
Mukherjee and Padgett (2006), Cella (2009) and Fahlenbrach (2009) found that 
firms run by a family display abnormal return relative to market model, Fama & French 
three-factor model and Carhart four-factor model. These results suggest that family 
firms’ investors require an extra return not capture by the factors included in the models 
due to its singular characteristics. 
However, family firms are not a homogeneous group. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
found that founder CEOs, heir managed and professional CEOs in family firms display 
different valuation.  
In this study we want to understand why the majority of family firms are headed by 
its founder. And why family firms’ management is passed on from the founder to heirs 
or professional managers? There are significant differences in firm behavior and 
valuation depending on CEOs identity? 
We have three main aims: 1) to understand how CEOs identity influences family 
firms risk exposure, 2) to analyze which factors are relevant to explain family firms’ 
stocks return by CEO identity, 3) to examine whether family firms abnormal return is 
explained by the market illiquidity and debt intensity. 
In this context, we analyze the Carhart four-factor model adding two factors which 
are relevant for explaining excess stock return: aggregate market illiquidity and debt 
intensity. The afore-mentioned model had already been used to study this issue by 
Corstjens et al. (2006), and Fahlenbrach (2009). The two new factors introduced have 
strong empirical support not only to explain excess return but also family firm 
characteristics. 
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We analyze two countries with small-scale financial markets: Portugal and Spain, 
during the period from January of 1999 to December of 2008. These two markets have 
strong interest, not only due to the predominance of family firms, but also due to their 
differences compared to Anglo-Saxon economies on which most studies on this issue 
are focused.  
Therefore, our results fill de gap in financial literature and can be extrapolated to 
countries with similar financial markets, on which there is no comprehensive study.  
We contribute to the extended literature in several ways. First, we introduce two 
new explicative factors in order to understand if the market misprices family firms or if 
the Carhart four-factor model is insufficient to explain its stock return.  
Second, we analyze if CEOs identity has impact on the firms’ stock return. 
Researchers focus attention on return’s differences between family and non-family 
firms. However due to agency costs is important to understand whether CEOs identity is 
linked to firms’ stock return.  
Third, we shed light on the debate surrounding family firms’ valuation. It is difficult 
to correctly value family firms because its information is scarce. This study helps 
investors to deeply understand family firms. Finally, we also contribute to growing 
literature, not only because we analyze an unusual topic, but also because we focus on 
two small financial markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews prior 
literature on this issue and outlines the hypotheses of this study. Section 3 describes the 
sample structure, dataset and methodology. Section 4 shows the empirical results. 
Finally, section 5 highlights the main conclusions. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Family firms are present all over the world, playing a vital role to economies’ 
growth (Chami, 2001).  
The first study to highlight the importance of ownership structure appeared in 1932, 
by Berle and Means. However, only after 2000, researchers focused their attention on 
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family firms to detect its competitive advantages and limitations (Sraer and Thesmar, 
2007).  
There are several reasons which explain this temporal difference. First, is difficult to 
obtain sufficient ownership data to classify firms into family and non-family firms. 
Second, it is complex to collect data for a large sample. Researchers normally solve this 
problem analyzing publicly traded corporations to which there is more information 
transparency. Finally, there are innumerous definitions of family firms, which make 
comparisons across studies difficult. 
Analyzing the concepts of family firms, we find two fundamental elements: 
ownership and management. Merging the various definitions, we can state that a firm is 
classified as a family firm whenever it is owned by a family and one or more family 
members belong to the board of directors1. This definition is similar to those of 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Sraer and Thresmar (2007).  
Researchers devote more attention to family firm issues regarding agency conflicts, 
succession, and operational performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). More recently, 
due to financial market globalization and instability, studies related to the impact of 
family firms on stocks’ return and risk exposures have been published.  
 Using the behavioral theory, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) found that family firms’ 
first concern is with the family’s socioemotional wealth in detriment to the firm’s value-
maximization. Family members look for reputation, identity, history and values 
continuation, and perpetuation of the family dynasty. Likewise its exposure to risk is 
distinct from non-family firms. 
In fact, Corstjens et al. (2006), Mukherjee and Padgett (2006), Cella (2009), and 
Fahlenbrach (2009) found that family and non-family firms have different risk 
exposure.  
The singular characteristics of family firms, namely the lack of information 
transparency, long-term perspective, affiliation between investors and board of 
directors, governance structure and risk proclivity set it apart from its non-family 
                                                 
1
 More details of family firm definitions are shown in Miller et al. (2007). 
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counterparts. The market gives family firms an abnormal return, which is not captured 
by traditional factors of asset pricing models.  
Not only family ownership may have influence on the firm’s stock return, but also 
CEOs identity. Managers are responsible for the firm’s decision, and consequently its 
welfare and uncertainty (Westhead and Howorth, 2006). 
Attending to agency theory, managers’ natural tendency is to allocate the firm’s 
resources in their self-interests, especially when they are not the firm owners or highly 
controlled by them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
This agency problem between the agent and the principal is normally mitigated in 
family firms as both positions belong to family members or the family highly controls 
the agent (Burkart et al., 2003).  
However, the impact of the founder CEO, other family member or an extern 
professional manager on the firm decisions, valuation and risk may be different.  
Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Sraer and Thresmar (2007) found, to U.S firms, 
that founder CEO, heir managed and professional CEOs in family firms display 
different valuation.  
The founder CEO differs from other family member or an extern professional 
manager in several aspects. The founder sees the firm as his life’s achievement 
(Fahlenbrach, 2009). He has created the firm, and consequently sees it not only as an 
extension of his wealth, but also his job, reputation, market recognition, and patrimony 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
The founder has an intrinsic motivation to pursue optimal shareholder-value 
maximization strategy. He brings unique and value-adding skills to the firm, power and 
influence in the decision-making. Decisions are made on a long-run horizon avoiding 
“manager’s myopia” of short-term results (Chami, 2001, Schulze et al., 2003). 
However, the founder has difficulty not only to transmit the firm’s information to 
his heirs and other shareholders, but also to pass on the firm.  
His heirs may be less efficient CEOs. For one side, family members can be in the 
firm and CEOs position due to their parents’ obligation. They may not have sufficient 
motivation to run the firm. Therefore they may consume perquisites or invest in 
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personal projects when the firm has free cash flows, leading to expropriation of its 
wealth and increasing risk (Aronoff and Ward, 1996, Nieto et al., 2009). 
For another side, family members as CEOs may try to prove that they can do a 
better job than the founder, changing the firm strategy. The problem is that they may not 
know the previous strategy, nor the firm experience or the market need.  
Family members’ lack of sufficient knowledge leads to firm’s wealth expropriation 
and value destruction and, in turn, increases the firm’s probability of bankruptcy. In 
fact, on average, only 30% of family firms make it to the second generation (Aronoff 
and Ward, 1996). 
An extern professional hired as a CEO may be more capable and talented than the 
founder or other family member due to his better knowledge of the market and the job. 
However, he is normally expensive, especially to small-size firms.  
Moreover, since he may not feel sufficiently rewarded, he tries to achieve 
consumption goals leading to investors’ wealth expropriation (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). He may try to run the firm, increasing its size to achieve higher market 
reputation.  
The following hypothesis naturally follows: 
Hypothesis 1: CEO’s identity is important to explain family firm’s risk exposure. 
We analyze the following risk exposures: market risk, company size and growth 
potential, performance persistence, market illiquidity and debt intensity. 
Firms controlled by the founder and heirs may have less exposure to market risk 
since these firms are not only influenced by the macroeconomic factors, but also by 
specific singularities.  
We also expect that founder and other family members as CEOs tend to run small-
size firms. Contract an external professional implies not only the cost of salary but also 
the cost of his control. As smaller firms experience higher financial problems, the 
family retains the firm control when it has a small-size (Corstjens et al., 2006). 
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To large-size firms, the better knowledge of a professional manager may 
compensate his costs. It may be benefic to increase the firm’s financial wealth and the 
family’s social wealth. 
Growing firms are normally controlled by its founder. The founder aim is to pass on 
the firm to his heirs. However, as it is an extension of the founder’s wealth and it is also 
a part of his life, he retains its control till being sick or the firm is stable (Sraer and 
Thesmar, 2007). 
Information about family firms is scarce, especially when the founder is its CEO, 
since he tries to concentrate all ownership and information (Heflin and Shaw, 2000). 
Likewise, investors may react later to new information about these firms, leading to 
short-term return persistence.  
Moreover, we anticipate that family firm’s shares tend to be more illiquid when the 
firm is controlled by the family than by an extern (Rojo-Ramírez, 2009). Firms run by a 
professional tend to be more open to new shareholders and, likewise, it shares are more 
liquid and less sensitive to market illiquidity (Miralles and Miralles, 2006). 
We expect that debt, as it is an important external mechanism for controlling agency 
conflicts, is more used by professional-managed firms (Burkart et al., 2003). The family 
uses debt with precaution since it increases the firm’s probability of failure and, 
consequently, the loss of their socioemotional wealth (Guiménez-Zuriaga, 2005). 
Finally, Fahlenbrach (2009) found a significant positive abnormal return for founder 
CEOs. The singular characteristics the founder brings to family firms may be not 
capture by the usual factor of asset pricing models.  
 
3.  DATA 
3.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES 
We examine the question of family control impact on firm’s stock return using a 
sample of publicly traded Portuguese and Spanish family firms. The data was collected 
from January of 1998 to December of 2008. 
Portugal and Spain are two small-scale financial markets with a predominance of 
family firms. Studies analyzing this type of countries are scarce, giving especial 
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importance to the present study. Our results can be extrapolated to countries with 
similar characteristics, where there is no comprehensive study on this area. 
First, we analyzed ownership information to classify firms into family firms. From 
Amadeus and Reuters databases we collected, for each year in analysis, the names of the 
firm’s owners and managers. Then we manually classify firms.  
A firm is classified as family firm whenever there is fractional equity ownership of 
the founding family and the presence of family members on the board of directors. We 
delete non-family firms, firms with missing information, and firms which started as 
family firm and have changed to non-family one or vice-versa. 
Our final sample consists of 270 and 415 observations to Portugal and Spain, 
respectively. The structure of the sample is present in table 1. 
Table 1: Sample Structure 
 Portugal Spain 
1999 29 35 
2000 30 39 
2001 30 43 
2002 29 47 
2003 28 45 
2004 26 45 
2005 27 46 
2006 26 41 
2007 23 39 
2008 22 35 
Total number of 
observations 
270 415 
Number of firms per year and country. 
For each firm selected, we looked for information on its website to identify CEOs 
identity. We classify CEO in founder, other family member or an independent 
professional. We do not identify descendents because not always the firms display that 
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specific information, so we prefer to call other family members than have 
misspecification problems.  
Table 2: CEO identity 
 Portugal Spain 
Founder 51,74% 52,66% 
Family 22,91% 22,32% 
Professional 25,35% 25,02% 
Percentage (average from 1999 to 2008) of family firms controlled by its founder, other family member 
or an independent professional by country. 
Analyzing table 2, which presents the sample structure by type of CEO, we find that 
family firms are normally controlled by its founder or other family member. The 
founder tends to maintain the firm control and decision power, since he has a special 
motivation to run the firm. Only in 25% of firms there is an extern professional 
manager. These results are similar to those of Sraer and Thesmar (2007) to French 
family firms. 
Financial information was collected from DataStream database. We use: individual 
daily and monthly closing price, and daily trading volume, and annual market value and 
book-to-market ratio for all for all Portuguese and Spanish publicly traded firms. 
We used official databases, namely Banco de Portugal, and Bolsa y Mercado 
Españoles, to collect information about monthly closing price for PSI20 (Portuguese 
Market Index) and IBEX35 (Spanish Market Index), and monthly treasury bill rate. 
Based on these data, we calculate the firm’s monthly return as the relative spread 
between its closing price in month t and in previous month. Excess return of founder-
controlled, other family-controlled and professional managed firms is the difference 
between its portfolio return and the risk free rate, which is the monthly treasury bill rate 
observed.  
We build zero-cost portfolios by buying shares of founder-controlled firms and 
selling shares of other family-controlled or professional managed firms, and buying 
shares of other family-controlled firms and selling shares of professional managed 
firms.  
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Two portfolios are created: one equally-weighted (R) and another value-weighted 
(Rp). 
Market risk factor (Rm-Rf) is the difference between the market return and the risk 
free rate. The market return is calculated as the variation of the monthly close price of 
PSI20, to Portugal, and IBEX35, to Spain.  
SMB (Small minus Big), also called size factor, is the portfolio of return differences 
between the smallest and the biggest firms in the sample. To measure the firm size we 
use its market value. HML (High minus Low) is the portfolio of return differences 
between the 30% highest and 30% smallest book-to-market firms in the sample. Both 
risk factors are created following the Fama & French (1993) approach. 
WML (Winners minus Losers) measures the performance persistence in the short-
run. This portfolio is formed by taking the differences between an equally-weighted 
average of the firms with the highest and the lowest 30% eleven-month return lagged 
one month.  
Iliq is the aggregate market illiquidity. First we use the illiquidity ratio of Amihud 
(2002) to calculate the monthly illiquidity of each stock traded. Then we calculate the 
market illiquidity as the equally-weighted portfolio of individual illiquidity to each 
stock traded at least 15 days by month (not necessarily consecutively). We eliminate 
outliers cap at a maximum value of 30% of individual illiquidity (Acharya and 
Pederson, 2005, Miralles and Miralles, 2006).2 
Finally, Debt is the market debt intensity, calculated as the monthly average of 
individual debt intensity. First we calculate to each stock the ratio between debt and 
market value. We also eliminate outliers at the 1% upper and lower tails of individual 
debt intensity (Fama & French, 1992). 
 
3.2 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Table 3 shows descriptive information of our sample, specifically mean, maximum 
and minimum values, and standard deviation.  
                                                 
2
 We also use normalized market illiquidity following Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and Miralles and 
Miralles (2006) approach. Although this variable (in alternative of aggregate illiquidity) is insignificant to 
explain the dependent variables. These results are available upon request. 
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Panel A shows the results for the Portuguese sample, and panel B for the Spanish 
sample. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Portugal 
Founder 0,006 0,150 -0,183 0,057 
Founderp 0,002 0,211 -0,216 0,063 
Family 0,005 0,120 -0,187 0,047 
Familyp 0,004 0,197 -0,256 0,067 
Other 0,023 0,922 -0,221 0,147 
Otherp 0,007 0,6201 -0,303 0,087 
Rm – Rf -0,006 0,179 -0,211 0,056 
SMB 0,018 0,517 -0,127 0,071 
HML -0,020 0,236 -0,383 0,079 
WML 1,038 2,102 0,564 0,291 
Iliq 2,674 4,697 0,763 0,779 
Debt 0,002 0,004 0,001 0,001 
Panel B: Spain 
Founder 0,006 0,176 -0,118 0,051 
Founderp 0,006 0,137 -0,183 0,063 
Family 0,007 0,125 -0,077 0,034 
Familyp 0,003 0,141 -0,133 0,053 
Other 0,006 0,263 -0,135 0,059 
Otherp 0,009 0,190 -0,193 0,062 
Rm – Rf -0,002 0,158 -0,173 0,057 
SMB -0,000 0,079 -0,076 0,030 
HML -0,009 0,073 -0,136 0,031 
WML 0,607 1,294 0,412 0,121 
Iliq 0,344 0,961 0,059 0,218 
Debt 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,000 
Descriptive statistics, namely mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation for equally-weighted 
(R) and value-weighted portfolios (Rp) excess return of founder-controlled (Founder, Founderp), other 
family-controlled (Family, Familyp), and professional-managed firms (Other, Otherp), market risk factor 
(Rm – Rf), mimicking portfolio factor return of size (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and performance 
persistence in the short-run (WML), aggregate market illiquidity (Iliq) measured by Amihud’s illiquidity 
ratio, and debt intensity (Debt). 
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On average, professional-managed Portuguese firms exhibit higher return than 
founder-controlled and other family controlled firms. To Spain, results are similar when 
we use value-weighted portfolios, but using equally-weighted portfolios we find that, on 
average, founder-controlled and professional managed firms present similar returns.  
These results suggest that is not indifferent to use equally-weighted or value-
weighted portfolios, especially to Spain. The firm’s market value has impact on 
conclusions. 
Due to market recession, the market index as suffer significant return losses. 
Likewise the market risk factor is, on average, negative. 
For both countries, there is evidence of an anomaly of the book-to-market effect. 
The negative coefficient of the mean HML factor contradicts the results found on the 
U.S. and other markets (Chan et al., 1991, Fama & French, 1992). New companies may 
find it difficult to thrive on the Portuguese and Spanish market since investors prefer to 
invest in established firms for which they have more information. 
Finally, market illiquidity is more evident to Portugal than to Spain, while debt 
intensity is similar to both countries. 
The correlation matrix is shown in table 4.  
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Table 4: Correlation Coefficients 
 Founder Family Other Fouderp Familyp Otherp Rm-Rf SMB HML WML Iliq Debt 
Panel A: Portugal 
Founder 1            
Family 0,531 1           
Other 0,219 0,150 1          
Founderp 0,874 0,573 0,193 1         
Familyp 0,592 0,864 0,144 0,625 1        
Otherp 0,427 0,278 0,603 0,444 0,291 1       
Rm-Rf 0,710 0,603 0,222 0,816 0,623 0,484 1      
SMB -0,054 -0,148 0,562 -0,124 -0,217 0,054 -0,191 1     
HML 0,046 0,108 -0,116 0,164 0,063 0,047 0,245 -0,046 1    
WML -0,023 0,026 -0,084 0,021 0,037 -0,000 0,111 -0,109 0,105 1   
Iliq -0,166 -0,032 -0,068 -0,089 -0,108 -0,102 -0,054 0,019 -0,005 0,002 1  
Debt -0,197 -0,234 -0,078 -0,128 -0,193 -0,053 -0,149 -0,063 0,011 -0,333 0,315 1 
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 Founder Family Other Fouderp Familyp Otherp Rm-Rf SMB HML WML Iliq Debt 
 Panel B: Spain 
Founder 1            
Family 0,692 1           
Other 0,765 0,597 1          
Founderp 0,761 0,513 0,633 1         
Familyp 0,709 0,780 0,653 0,492 1        
Otherp 0,683 0,423 0,751 0,654 0,518 1       
Rm-Rf 0,755 0,476 0,670 0,891 0,468 0,724 1      
SMB -0,136 0,054 -0,091 -0,379 -0,080 -0,349 -0,470 1     
HML -0,111 -0,052 -0,169 -0,102 -0,113 -0,167 -0,046 0,406 1    
WML 0,010 -0,060 -0,019 -0,081 -0,060 -0,065 -0,078 0,070 -0,013 1   
Iliq -0,101 -0,108 -0,027 -0,081 -0,041 -0,020 -0,089 -0,101 -0,092 -0,117 1  
Debt -0,267 -0,231 -0,149 -0,252 -0,259 -0,169 -0,223 0,018 0,116 0,260 0,212 1 
Correlation coefficient between equally-weighted (R) and value-weighted portfolios (Rp) excess return founder-controlled (Founder, Founderp), other family-controlled (Family, Familyp), and professional-managed firms (Other, Otherp), market risk factor (Rm – Rf), mimicking portfolio factor return of size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), 
and performance persistence in the short-run (WML), Momentum, (Mom), aggregate market illiquidity (Iliq2) measured by Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, and debt intensity (Debt). 
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For both countries, correlation between dependent variables – excess return of 
founder-controlled, family-controlled and professional-managed firms – is high, but it is 
not significant since these are alternative variables. There is also a high correlation 
between dependent variables and market-risk factor, which was expected.  
To Spain, it is also important to point out the correlation between SMB and HML 
factors, suggesting that market value and book-value vary in the same way.  
None of the remaining variables are highly correlated, at least not to a significant 
extent. 
 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
To validate our hypotheses we select an existing asset pricing model – Carhart four-
factor model - and include some new factors – market aggregate illiquidity and debt 
intensity - to improve the models estimation. 
Carhart Model: 
( ) tiptpttpttfmptitpt WMLpHMLhSMBsRRr ×+×+×+−×+= βα            (1) 
The four-factor model of Carhart (1997) is an extension of the market-model 
proposed by Sharpe (1964), and developed by Lintner (1965), Treynor (1965) and 
Black (1972), and the three-factor model of Fama & French (1993).  
This model uses four factors to explain portfolios’ expected return: market risk (Rm-
Rf), company size (SMB) and growth potential (HML), and performance persistence 
(WML). 
Firms’ return naturally follows the market risk tendencies (Black et al., 1972). The 
firm’s size is also a relevant factor to explain expect return. Smaller firms are normally 
less efficient, have more debt intensity, and therefore have higher probability of failure 
(Banz, 1981, Fama & French, 1992). Likewise, investors receive a premium to invest in 
this kind of firms.  
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A premium is given to investors of high book-to-market stocks, because are firms 
with fewer growth opportunities, and higher risk of failure (Chan et al., 1991, Fama & 
French, 1992).   
The performance persistence in the short-run explains firms’ return as well. 
Investors’ adaptation to new information is slow, and so they may have gains by 
creating a portfolio buying winner’s stocks in the short-run and selling loser’s stocks 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, Rouwenhorst, 1998, Liew and Vassalou, 2000, Soares e 
Serra, 2005).  
These factors are usually accepted in the context of asset pricing. However, in the 
context of corporate governance it may be necessary to include new factors to adapt to 
firm’s singular characteristics. 
In this context we propose two new factors: market aggregate illiquidity and market 
debt intensity. These new factors will be included in the previous model. 
New Models: 
( ) tiptiptpttpttfmptitpt IliqWMLpHMLhSMBsRRr ×+×+×+×+−×+= λβα    (2) 
( ) tiptiptpttpttfmptitpt DebtWMLpHMLhSMBsRRr ×+×+×+×+−×+= ηβα  (3) 
( )
tip
tiptiptpttpttfmptitpt
Debt
IliqWMLpHMLhSMBsRRr
×+
×+×+×+×+−×+=
η
λβα
   (4) 
Investors are not only concerned with risk and firm’s characteristics, but also with 
stock’s and market illiquidity. Illiquidity denotes that investors may have no 
opportunity to trade large quantities quickly without significant price movements 
(Acharya and Pederson, 2005, Miralles e Miralles, 2006).  
Firms’ shares more illiquid stocks are more sensitive to market illiquidity and so the 
market has to give a risk premium to these investors.  
We also include debt intensity (Debt) as an explanatory factor. Bhandari (1988) and 
Fama & French (1992) shed light to the importance of the variable debt to explain the 
firm’s excess return. Recent models of asset price exclude this factor of their models. 
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However, in the context of corporate governance debt has two main aims: solving 
agency conflicts and facilitating the firm’s growth, especially for the smallest ones.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Firstly we make a univariate analysis by exploring if there are differences in the 
mean return of founder-controlled, other family-controlled or professional-managed 
firms. Results are shown in table 5. 
Table 5: Return Differences of Mean Test 
 1 2 Difference (1-2) 
Panel A: Portugal 
Founder-Family 0,0063 0,0050 0,0013 
Founder-Other 0,0063 0,0231 -0,0168 
Family-Other 0,0050 0,0231 -0,0181 * 
Founderp-Familyp 0,0018 0,0042 -0,0024 
Founderp-Otherp 0,0018 0,0069 -0,0051 
Familyp-Otherp 0,0042 0,0069 -0,0027 
Panel B: Spain 
Founder-Family 0,0064 0,0072 -0,0008 
Founder-Other 0,0064 0,0062 0,0003 
Family-Other 0,0072 0,0062 0,0010 
Founderp-Familyp 0,0055 0,0034 0,0021 
Founderp-Otherp 0,0055 0,0090 -0,0035 
Familyp-Otherp 0,0034 0,0090 -0,0056 
Return differences for equally-weighted (R) and value-weighted portfolios (Rp) between founder-
controlled (Founder/Founderp), other family-controlled (Family, Familyp) and professional-managed 
firms (Other, Otherp). 
By observing panel A, we find that family-controlled firms, by its founder or other 
family member, present on average less return than professional-managed firms. 
However the difference is not significant, suggesting that there are no relevant 
differences in family firm’s return depending on CEOs identity. 
Similar results are obtained to Spain (panel B). In this case, the differences in the 
mean return depend on the type of portfolios used – equally or value-weighted 
portfolios. 
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We estimate the previous models described using the GMM (Generalized Method of 
Moments) approach of Mackinlay and Richardson (1991) to mitigate potential problems 
of linear regression models. 
The regression results for Portugal are present in table 6. Panel A shows the results 
for equally-weighted portfolios, and panel B for value-weighted. 
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Table 6: Results of founder-controlled, family-controlled and professional managed firms’ return to Portugal 
 C Rm - Rf
 SMB HML WML Iliq Div R2 Adj. R2 
Panel A – Equally-Weighted Portfolios 
Model 1 
Founder 0,022 * 0,772 *** 0,061 -0,093 * -0,017   53,59% 51,97% 
Family 0,012 0,505 *** -0,025 -0,023 -0,007   36,77% 34,57% 
Other 0,018 1,013 *** 1,282 *** -0,333 -0,020   46,03% 44,15% 
Fonder-Family 0,010 0,267 ** 0,086 -0,070 -0,010   8,78% 5,61% 
Founder-Other 0,005 -0,242 -1,221 *** 0,240 0,004   36,58% 34,37% 
Family-Other -0,006 -0,508 ** -1,307 *** 0,310 0,014   41,76% 39,73% 
Model 2 
Founder 0,047 *** 0,765 *** 0,062 -0,092 * -0,017 * -0,009 **  55,20% 53,24% 
Family 0,012 0,505 *** -0,025 -0,023 -0,007 0,000  36,77% 34,00% 
Other 0,047 1,005 *** 1,283 *** -0,332 -0,020 -0,011  46,39% 44,04% 
Fonder-Family 0,035 * 0,259 ** 0,087 -0,069 -0,010 -0,009 *  10,84% 6,93% 
Founder-Other -0,001 -0,240 -1,221 *** 0,240 0,004 0,002  36,59% 33,81% 
Family-Other -0,036 -0,499 ** -1,308 *** 0,309 0,014 0,011  42,12% 39,58% 
Model 3 
Founder 0,061 *** 0,753 *** 0,049 -0,086 * -0,025 **  -14,558 ** 54,90% 52,92% 
Family 0,059 ** 0,482 *** -0,040 -0,014 -0,017  -18,003 ** 39,73% 37,09% 
Other 0,010 1,017 *** 1,284 *** -0,334 -0,019  2,761 46,04% 43,67% 
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 C Rm - Rf
 SMB HML WML Iliq Div R2 Adj. R2 
Fonder-Family 0,001 0,271 *** 0,089 -0,072 -0,008  3,445 8,87% 4,87% 
Founder-Other 0,050 -0,264 -1,236 *** 0,249 -0,006  -17,319 36,86% 34,09% 
Family-Other 0,049 -0,536 ** -1,325 *** 0,320 0,002  -20,764 42,16% 39,62% 
Model 4 
Founder 0,069 *** 0,753 *** 0,053 -0,087 * -0,022 * -0,007 * -10,297 * 55,78% 53,44% 
Family 0,055 ** 0,482 *** -0,043 -0,014 -0,018 0,004 -20,354 ** 40,13% 36,95% 
Other 0,025 1,017 *** 1,292 *** -0,337 -0,014 -0,013 10,539 46,48% 43,64% 
Fonder-Family 0,014 0,271 ** 0,096 -0,074 -0,004 -0,011 ** 10,057 11,53% 6,83% 
Founder-Other 0,044 -0,264 -1,239 *** 0,250 -0,008 0,006 -20,836 36,95% 33,60% 
Family-Other 0,030 -0,536 ** -1,335 *** 0,324 -0,004 0,017 -30,893 42,90% 39,87% 
Panel B – Value-Weighted Portfolios 
Model 1 
Founder 0,018 * 0,940 *** 0,024 -0,026 -0,014   67,24% 66,10% 
Family 0,014 0,748 *** -0,098 -0,078 -0,008   40,77% 38,71% 
Other 0,015 0,822 *** 0,180 * -0,080 -0,011   26,33% 23,77% 
Fonder-Family 0,004 0,192 0,122 0,052 -0,006   6,05% 2,78% 
Founder-Other 0,003 0,118 -0,156 0,054 -0,004   3,44% 0,08% 
Family-Other -0,001 -0,074 -0,278 ** 0,002 0,003   4,45% 1,12% 
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 C Rm - Rf
 SMB HML WML Iliq Div R2 Adj. R2 
Model 2 
Founder 0,028 * 0,937 *** 0,024 -0,026 -0,014 -0,004  67,43% 66,00% 
Family 0,031 0,743 *** -0,097 -0,078 -0,008 -0,006  41,29% 38,71% 
Other 0,038 0,816 *** 0,181 * -0,080 -0,010 -0,009  26,92% 23,71% 
Fonder-Family -0,003 0,194 0,122 0,052 -0,006 0,003  6,18% 2,06% 
Founder-Other -0,010 0,121 -0,157 0,054 -0,004 0,005  3,66% -0,56% 
Family-Other -0,007 -0,073 -0,279 ** 0,002 0,003 0,002  4,49% 0,30% 
Model 3 
Founder 0,027 0,935 *** 0,021 -0,024 -0,016  -3,529 67,30% 65,87% 
Family 0,064 ** 0,723 *** -0,114 -0,069 -0,019  -18,930 ** 42,36% 39,84% 
Other 0,001 0,829 *** 0,185 * -0,083 -0,008  5,165 26,40% 23,18% 
Fonder-Family -0,036 0,212 * 0,135 0,045 0,002  15,401 * 7,53% 3,47% 
Founder-Other 0,026 0,106 -0,164 0,058 -0,008  -8,694 3,67% -0,56% 
Family-Other 0,062 -0,106 -0,299 ** 0,014 -0,011  -24,096 5,79% 1,66% 
Model 4 
Founder 0,031 0,935 *** 0,023 -0,025 -0,015 -0,003 -1,620 67,44% 65,71% 
Family 0,067 ** 0,723 *** -0,112 -0,070 -0,018 -0,003 -17,244 * 42,46% 39,41% 
Other 0,013 0,829 *** 0,191 * -0,085 -0,004 -0,011 * 11,431 27,23% 23,36% 
Fonder-Family -0,036 0,212 * 0,135 0,045 0,003 -0,000 15,624 * 7,53% 2,62% 
Founder-Other 0,018 0,106 -0,168 0,060 -0,011 0,007 -13,051 4,12% -0,97% 
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 C Rm - Rf
 SMB HML WML Iliq Div R2 Adj. R2 
Family-Other 0,054 -0,106 -0,303 ** 0,015 -0,014 0,008 -28,675 * 6,17% 1,19% 
Regression of the excess return of founder-controlled (founder), other family-controlled (Family) and professional-managed (other) firms on the excess market return 
(Rm – Rf) and mimicking returns of size (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and performance persistence in the short-run (WML) factors, momentum (Mom), aggregate 
market illiquidity (Iliq2), and debt intensity (Debt). 
Model 1 is the Carhart four-factor model, model 2 is the model 2 including aggregate market illiquidity factor, model 3 is de model 2 including market debt intensity 
factor, model 4 is the model 2 including aggregate market illiquidity and market debt intensity factors. 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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By observing panel A – equally-weighted portfolios - we confirm the validity of our 
hypothesis for Portugal: CEOs identity is important to explain the firm’s risk exposure. 
Founder-controlled firms display a higher (lower) factor loading on market risk 
(aggregate market illiquidity) than other family-controlled firms. When the family firm 
is passed on to other family members, its strategy tends to change.  
First the firm’s shares are normally more dispersed, and consequently are less 
illiquid. Moreover, as descendents tendency is to consume perquisites or invest in 
personal projects the firm’s risk increases, not only due to macroeconomic environment. 
As we state before, only 30% of family firms make it to the second generation (Aronoff 
and Ward, 1996). This may be explained to higher exposure to other risks. 
The difference between founder-controlled and professional-managed firms is 
regarding the size factor. As we expected, founder-controlled firms tend to be smaller, 
since these firms experience higher financial problems, and have no financial wealth to 
hire a professional manager. This result is similar to those of Corstjens et al. (2006). 
Other family-controlled firms display a lower factor loading on market risk and size, 
for the reasons already explained. 
When we look for singular analysis, it means, by type of CEO, we conclude that 
founder and other family-controlled firms exhibit an abnormal return of 7% and 6% per 
month, respectively. This return does not disappear when we introduce the two new 
factors, suggesting that financial investors require an extra return not capture by the 
factor model to invest in family-controlled firms. However, this abnormal return is not 
evident when we create a zero-cost portfolio. 
Analyzing value-weighted portfolios (panel B) the results for zero-cost portfolios 
created are similar and our hypothesis is also validated. 
Although to individual analysis we find a major difference. The abnormal return of 
founder-controlled firms disappears when we introduce the debt intensity factor. This 
result suggests that this extra return is explained by the market value and the market 
debt intensity. May be it is given to smaller founder-controlled firms because these 
firms tend to have higher risk of failure, less information transparency, and more 
financial problems and operational inefficiencies. 
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Contrary to this conclusion, to other family-controlled firms the abnormal return is 
only significant when we include the market debt intensity. Shareholders of these firms 
ask for an extra return of 7% per month. As we explain before, other family members 
may have less information, motivation and knowledge to run the firm, and this lack of 
information is perceive by the market.  
Table 7 presents the same analysis to the Spanish sample.  
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Table 7: Results of founder-controlled, family-controlled and professional managed firms’ return to Spain 
 C Rm - Rf
 SMB HML WML Mom Iliq Div R2 Adj. R2 
Panel A – Equally-Weighted portfolios 
Model 1 
Founder -0,012 0,845 *** 0,674 *** -0,370 *** 0,022    67,58% 66,45% 
Family 0,011 0,410 *** 0,528 *** -0,228 *** -0,012    36,16% 33,93% 
Other -0,004 0,908 *** 0,878 *** -0,585 *** 0,007    58,95% 57,52% 
Fonder-Family -0,022 ** 0,435 *** 0,145 -0,143 0,034 *    39,62% 37,52% 
Founder-Other -0,008 -0,063 -0,204 0,214 0,016    3,06% -0,32% 
Family-Other 0,015 -0,498 *** -0,349 * 0,357 ** -0,018    29,99% 27,55% 
Model 2 
Founder -0,012 0,846 *** 0,676 *** -0,370 *** 0,023  0,002  67,58% 66,16% 
Family 0,012 0,407 *** 0,524 *** -0,229 *** -0,013  -0,004  36,22% 33,42% 
Other -0,013 0,921 *** 0,901 *** -0,580 *** 0,011  0,020  59,44% 57,66% 
Fonder-Family -0,025 * 0,439 *** 0,152 -0,141 0,035 *  0,006  39,73% 37,09% 
Founder-Other 0,001 -0,075 -0,225 0,210 0,012  -0,018  4,00% -0,21% 
Family-Other 0,026 -0,514 *** -0,377 ** 0,351 ** -0,023  -0,024  31,09% 28,06% 
Model 3 
Founder -0,004 0,828 *** 0,650 *** -0,350 *** 0,029   -12,470 67,91% 66,50% 
Family 0,015 0,399 *** 0,513 *** -0,214 *** -0,007   -8,223 36,48% 33,69% 
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 C Rm - Rf
 SMB HML WML Mom Iliq Div R2 Adj. R2 
Other -0,015 0,933 *** 0,913 *** -0,615 *** -0,004   18,646 * 59,50% 57,72% 
Fonder-Family -0,020 * 0,430 *** 0,137 -0,136 0,036 *   -4,247 0.396949 0.370499 
Founder-Other 0,010 -0,105 -0,263 * 0,264 * 0,033   -31,115** 6,66% 2,57% 
Family-Other 0,030 * -0,534 *** -0,400 ** 0,400 *** -0,004   -26,869** 31,76% 28,76% 
Model 4 
Founder -0,020 0,939 *** 0,925 *** -0,605 *** 0,002  0,016 15,365 59,79% 57,65% 
Family 0,016 0,398 *** 0,511 *** -0,216 ** -0,008  -0,002 -7,807 36,49% 33,12% 
Other -0,020 0,939 *** 0,925 *** -0,605 *** 0,002  0,016 15,365 59,79% 57,65% 
Fonder-Family -0,022 0,432 *** 0,143 -0,132 0,039 *  0,007 -5,804 39,86% 36,67% 
Founder-Other 0,014 -0,109 -0,271 * 0,258 * 0,029  -0,010 -28,975*** 6,95% 2,01% 
Family-Other 0,036 ** -0,541 *** -0,414 ** 0,390 *** -0,010  -0,018 -23,172** 32,33% 28,74% 
Panel B – Value-Weighted portfolios 
Model 1 
Founder 0,008 1,049 *** 0,218 -0,205 -0,009    80,48% 79,80% 
Family 0,008 0,550 *** 0,499 ** -0,340 *** -0,016    27,69% 25,18% 
Other 0,009 0,827 *** 0,145 -0,321 ** -0,007    54,50% 52,92% 
Fonder-Family -0,000 0,499 *** -0,281 0,135 0,007    30,03% 27,60% 
Founder-Other -0,001 0,222 ** 0,073 0,116 -0,002    5,55% 2,26% 
Family-Other -0,001 -0,277 ** 0,353 -0,018 -0,009    15,28% 12,33% 
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 C Rm - Rf
 SMB HML WML Mom Iliq Div R2 Adj. R2 
Model 2 
Founder 0,008 1,049 *** 0,219 -0,205 -0,009  0,000  80,48% 79,62% 
Family 0,006 0,553 *** 0,504 ** -0,339 *** -0,015  0,004  27,72% 24,55% 
Other 0,004 0,834 *** 0,158 -0,319 ** -0,005  0,011  54,65% 52,66% 
Fonder-Family 0,002 0,496 *** -0,285 0,134 0,006  -0,004  30,05% 26,98% 
Founder-Other 0,004 0,214 ** 0,060 0,114 -0,004  -0,011  5,74% 1,60% 
Family-Other 0,003 -0,282 ** 0,345 -0,020 -0,011  -0,007  15,35% 11,63% 
Model 3 
Founder 0,013 1,037 *** 0,202 -0,192 -0,004   -8,407 80,57% 79,7212 
Family 0,022 0,517 *** 0,452 ** -0,301 *** -0,003   -24,460 28,88% 25,77% 
Other 0,006 0,834 *** 0,156 -0,330 ** -0,010   5,570 54,55% 52,55% 
Fonder-Family -0,010 0,520 *** -0,250 0,109 -0,002   16,053 30,44% 27,39% 
Founder-Other 0,007 0,203 * 0,047 0,139 0,006   -13,977 5,94% 1,82% 
Family-Other 0,017 -0,317 ** 0,297 0,030 0,007   -30,030 * 16,81% 13,17% 
Model 4 
Founder 0,012 1,038 *** 0,204 -0,190 -0,003  0,003 -8,985 80,58% 79,55% 
Family 0,018 0,521 *** 0,461 ** -0,294 ** 0,001  0,011 -26,846 29,08% 25,31% 
Other 0,002 0,838 *** 0,164 -0,324 ** -0,007  0,010 3,367 54,67% 52,26% 
Fonder-Family -0,007 0,517 *** -0,257 0,104 -0,004  -0,009 17,861 30,53% 26,84% 
Founder-Other 0,010 0,200 * 0,041 0,134 0,003  -0,008 -12,512 6,03% 1,04% 
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 C Rm - Rf
 SMB HML WML Mom Iliq Div R2 Adj. R2 
Family-Other 0,016 -0,317 ** 0,297 0,030 0,008  0,001 -30,212 * 16,81% 12,40% 
Regression of the excess return of founder-controlled (founder), other family-controlled (Family) and professional-managed (other) firms on the excess market return 
(Rm – Rf) and mimicking returns of size (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and performance persistence in the short-run (WML) factors, momentum (Mom), aggregate 
market illiquidity (Iliq2), and debt intensity (Debt). 
Model 1 is the Carhart four-factor model, model 2 is the model 2 including aggregate market illiquidity factor, model 3 is de model 2 including market debt intensity 
factor, model 4 is the model 2 including aggregate market illiquidity and market debt intensity factors. 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The results obtained to Spain are quite different than those found to Portugal. 
However, we also validate our hypothesis which says that CEOs identity is important to 
explain the firm’s risk exposure. 
Founder-controlled firms display a higher factor loading on market risk and 
performance persistence than other family-controlled firms. Before we introduce the 
new factors in the four-factor model, we find that there is an abnormal return to family-
controlled firm. However this extra return is explained by the market aggregate 
illiquidity.  
Other family members have singular risk exposures, since they lack of sufficient 
information about how to run the firm. Additionally they may also have few 
motivations to do it, leading to destruction of the firm value. Nieto et al. (2009), for 
example, confirmed that founder’ descendents destroy the firm operational 
performance. This information may be perceived by the market. 
The difference between founder-controlled and professional-managed firms is 
regarding the size and growth potential factors. Smaller and growing firms are normally 
controlled by its founder. The founder retains the firm control when it has financial 
distresses and potential to increase. His natural tendency is to pass on the firm or 
contract a professional manager when the firm has outstanding performance (Sraer and 
Thesmar, 2007). Similar results were found to Portugal and by Corstjens et al. (2006). 
Other family-controlled firms display a lower (higher) factor loading on market risk 
and size (growing potential), for the reasons already explained. Moreover, exhibit an 
extra return of 4% per month. In this case, the abnormal return does not disappear with 
the new factors introduced in the model, suggesting that investors of financial firms 
require an extra premium to invest in family-controlled firms, may be due to its higher 
risk of failure and tendency to destroy the firm value. 
Analyzing value-weighted portfolios (panel B) the difference in risk exposure 
between CEOs identity is only regarding to market risk factor. 
Founder-controlled firms display a higher factor loading on market risk than other 
family-controlled and professional-managed firms. Contrary to our expectations, the 
return risk of founder-controlled firms is very similar to market risk. This result 
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suggests that, to Spain, when we consider the firm’ market value, the specific 
singularities of founder-controlled firms are not significant. 
Comparing the results of other family-controlled firms and professional managed-
firms, we confirm our anticipations, it means, family-controlled firms are not only 
influenced by the macroeconomic reasons but also by specific singularities, and 
financial investors perceive it. 
In this case, there is no evidence of an abnormal return, suggesting that the firm 
market value is sufficient to explain the market misprices of family-controlled firms. 
 
Portugal vs Spain 
There are significant differences in the results obtained for Portugal and Spain. 
Whilst for Portugal the major results persist using equally and value-weighted 
portfolios, for Spain the results are quite different when we use equally or value-
weighted portfolios.  
To Portugal, we find that family-controlled firms, by its founder or other family 
members, are smaller than the ones professional-managed. Moreover, other family-
controlled firms present some singular risk, not explain by macroeconomic factors. In 
this case, the abnormal return for family-controlled firms found by Fahlenbrach (2009) 
is not evident when we use value-weighted portfolios. 
To Spain, the abnormal return is obvious to other family-controlled firms when we 
use equally-weighted portfolios, but it disappears when we use value-weighted ones. 
Moreover, the differences in CEOs risk exposure is explained by market risk, size and 
growth potential when we use equally-weighted portfolios. However, when we weigh 
return using the market value, only market risk exposures is different depending on 
CEOs identity. 
Although, for both countries we find that CEOs identity is important to explain the 
firm risk exposure, confirming our hypothesis. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
Family firms are not only the oldest type of firms, but are also present all over the 
world. They play a vital role to the economy development. Likewise, understanding 
family firms is crucial. 
Some studies have been carrying on to explain family and non-family firms 
differences. We want to go a step further by understanding if the firm’s valuation 
depends on CEOs identity. 
Several studies describe that founder CEOs are more focused on the firm long-run, 
more concerned with the firms’ decision and investment opportunities. These results 
suggest that founder CEOs play a particular role in his organization. 
In this study we want to understand why the majority of family firms are headed by 
its founder. And if there are significant differences in firm behavior and valuation 
depending on CEOs identity. 
In this context we analyzed Portuguese and Spanish publicly traded corporations, 
during the period of January of 1999 to December of 2008. We not only use the four-
factor model of Carhart, as Fahlenbrach (2009), but also introduce two new factors: 
market illiquidity and debt intensity. Likewise we increase the explanatory power of the 
model and adapt it to corporate governance perspective. 
In contrast to findings by Fahlenbrach (2009) for the U.S., we do not find that 
founder CEO firms display an abnormal return. This extra return is explained either by 
using value-weighted portfolios or by market illiquidity and debt intensity – the two 
new factors introduced in the four-factor model of Carhart. 
We do find that who manages the family firm results in significantly different in risk 
exposures. To Portugal, founder and other family members tend to run smaller firms. 
Moreover, we found a significant market risk premium when we invest in founder-
controlled or professional-managed firms, instead of family-controlled firms. 
To Spain, founder and other family CEOs tend to run smaller and growth firms. 
Although, when we use value-weighted portfolios only the market risk premium 
explains the differences of who manage family firms. 
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These different risk exposures seem to be explained by performance differences. 
Therefore this analysis is complementary to those of Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), Nieto et al. (2009), among others. 
Additional, our results are important to shareholders and directors who are 
concerned about the strong position of a founder CEO within the firm. The founder 
retains the firm’s control since he brings value-adding skills. 
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